

Reflective and Unreflective Partisans?

Experimental Evidence on the Links between Information, Opinion, and Party Identification

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Abstract

We carry out a series of original experiments in three post-communist countries: Russia, Hungary, and Poland. The experiments test the extent to which information about political parties influences the development of partisanship in newly competitive party systems. We find that exposure to information about the positions of political parties tends to strengthen partisanship when party systems are at least somewhat stable. In Russia, where parties are relatively stable but not particularly relevant, this effect is generally constant across levels of political sophistication. In Hungary, however, where parties are both stable and extremely relevant to the political process, this effect has a curvilinear relationship to political sophistication, with strong effects present only for mid-level sophisticates. Conversely, reflecting on the proximity of parties to one's own position on issues (by completing issue position scales) weakens partisanship among the least politically sophisticated; this effect is present in Russia, Poland, and Hungary, so does not appear to be sensitive to variation in political context within the post-communist world. Taken together, they suggest that there may be two different paths to partisanship in newly competitive political systems, one which is more reflective and based on the policy position of political parties (e.g., a Downsian or rationalist approach) and one which may be less reflective and is more likely prevalent among less politically sophisticated citizens. We also introduce a new theoretical framework for synthesizing existing approaches to the study of partisanship that allows us both to transport the concept more seamlessly across different political contexts and to generate additional hypotheses concerning the determinants of partisanship.

Introduction

For at least a half century, scholars have considered *partisanship* the most important attribute explaining the political behavior of citizens. Partisanship is a predisposition to support a particular party. Some citizens even identify with a party, seeing their predisposition as a part of who they are. Scholars have claimed the power of partisanship extends beyond a “standing decision” from which citizens must be persuaded to defect. Partisanship may serve as a heuristic in the formation of policy opinions, a motivational force preparing one to act on behalf of a party, a cognitive structure that organizes one’s understanding of the political world, and a “perceptual screen” that can bias even one’s factual beliefs about the world.

Although much ink has been spilt on the topic of partisanship, there is much we still don’t know about its origins and consequences. Most of what we do know comes from the United States, where the same party attachments have taken root over generations. As a result, we know far more about the effects than the causes of partisanship and, even then, primarily about its effects in one country. Scholars have also questioned whether partisanship is the same beyond U.S. borders, or whether it reflects no more than current preferences in parliamentary party-list systems (Butler and Stokes 1969). Even in the United States, debate continues about the extent to which partisanship actually biases perceptions (Achen 1989; Bartels 2002; Gerber and Green 1998). Additionally, support for the positions staked out in many of these debates comes largely from empirical correlations and theoretical or methodological assumptions. Almost all studies of mass politics rely on survey and electoral data. However, these data impose limitations on the ability of scholars to make causal inferences. Although many competing claims about party ID suggest alternative causal processes (e.g., does partisanship cause citizens to see different worlds,

or do differing world views give rise to partisanship?), few scholars have tested claims about the impact and especially development of partisanship with experiments.

Moreover, in the last half century, democracy has spread in successive waves from 22 countries to well over 100 (Huntington 1991). During that same half century, the study of public opinion and voting behavior blossomed into one of the largest fields in political science. However, the bulk of this research remains focused on democracies in Western Europe and North America that have been around the longest. Because much research in older democracies suggests partisanship is close to an “unmoved mover,” empirical studies have focused overwhelmingly on its effects rather than its origin and development. Expanding the study of partisanship into newer and less consolidated democracies thus offers us a range of benefits, from being able to study partisanship across a greater variety of political contexts to the opportunity to observe the emergence of partisanship as it first develops.

To begin to address these gaps in the literature, we have carried out a series of original experiments in three post-communist countries: Russia, Hungary, and Poland. The experiments test the extent to which information about political parties – their stances on important policy issues and their proximity to voters – influences the development of partisanship in new democracies.¹ We also consider the way in which the effect of this information varies across political context (e.g., the stability and relevance of political parties) and individuals (e.g., by level of political sophistication).

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Exposure to information about the positions of political parties tends to strengthen partisanship when party systems are at least somewhat stable. In Russia, where parties are relatively stable but not particularly relevant, this

¹ We address the question of Russia’s status as a new democracy below, but for now use the term to refer generally to newly competitive party systems.

effect is generally constant across levels of political sophistication. In Hungary, however, where parties are both stable and extremely relevant to the political process, this effect has a curvilinear relationship to political sophistication, with strong effects present only for mid-level sophisticates. Conversely, reflecting on the proximity of parties to one's own position on issues (by completing issue position scales) weakens partisanship among the least politically sophisticated; this effect is present in Russia, Poland, and Hungary, so does not appear to be sensitive to variation in political context within the post-communist world. Taken together, the results suggest that there may be two different paths to partisanship in newly competitive political systems, one which is more reflective and based on the policy position of political parties (e.g., a Downsian or rationalist approach) and one which may be less reflective and is more likely prevalent among less politically sophisticated citizens.

We begin by providing some brief background on the major schools of thought in regard to partisanship in the literature and suggesting a means of synthesizing these approaches that allows us both to transport the concept more seamlessly across different political contexts and to generate additional hypotheses concerning the causes of partisanship. In the remaining sections, we lay out the specific hypotheses we test in this paper, the rationale behind our case selection, the details of our experimental design, and the method we use for analyzing our data. The results of the experiments are then presented, and we close with a brief discussion of the implications of the findings.

Conceptualizing Partisanship

Readers familiar with the study of party identification will have noticed that we have self-consciously chosen to eschew this phrase in favor of the term "partisanship". We have done so

in an effort both to reflect the existence of an extensive debate over the very nature of partisanship, but also in an effort to reconfigure this debate in a way that places it in a more appropriate context for comparative analysis across countries.

To date, there have been three dominant approaches to the study of partisanship in the political science literature. The “Michigan School” originally proposed that the root of partisanship lay in a psychological attachment to a political party (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969). When strong enough, this attachment could become part of a person’s identity, and thus the term partisan identity was born. A partisan, in this view, sees herself as belonging to a party (e.g., “I am a Social Democrat”) in much the same way she might see herself belonging to a religious faith (e.g., “I am a Catholic”). One consequence of this psychological approach to partisanship was that it predicted that partisanship ought to be fairly stable.

In response to empirical evidence suggesting that partisanship – both at the individual and aggregate levels – might not have been as stable as the original Michigan School models implied it should be, the “Rational Revisionist” school attempted to place the study of partisanship on a more rational footing. Far from being the result of sub-conscious psychological forces, partisanship was instead posited to be a “running tally” (Fiorina 1981) of one’s overall feelings about different political parties, and thus could be constantly updated as new perceptions of parties’ policy positions, effectiveness in office, competence, etc. became available to citizens (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Achen 1992, 2002).

The most recent addition to this debate has come from the perspective of social identity theory (Gerber and Green 1998; Green et al. 2002). Arguing both that the rational revisionists have overstated the degree of instability in individual and aggregate levels of partisanship but that the Michigan School mistakenly fixed the target of partisanship at the party itself, the social

identity approach suggest that partisanship is a function of realizing that one shares an identity with supporters of a particular party. Put another way, partisanship becomes a function of the extent to which an individual feels confident that a given party is supported by “people like me”.

One approach to adjudicating between these different theoretical approaches is to find conflicting hypotheses and to test them on empirical data. Indeed to date, this has largely been the approach of adherents of the different schools, almost all of which have focused on the use of data from American politics (although see Green et al. 2002). Here we propose an alternative, which is to suggest all three schools may provide useful pathways to partisanship, but that which of these school is relatively more important may depend on both political context and individual level characteristics. To make this argument, we augment traditional ways of thinking about partisanship in two ways. First, we make “partisanship”, not party identification, our primary variable of interest; we define partisanship simply as a predisposition to support or prefer a political party.² Like party identification, we can think of partisanship as ranging from weak (e.g., I generally prefer this party a little to the other parties) or strong (e.g., I could never fathom supporting another party). Second, we argue that partisanship itself is a direction function of confidence in one’s ability to ascertain one’s place in the political landscape. We do not intend to measure this confidence separately from one’s partisanship – indeed, one can argue that the two are essentially functionally equivalent – but instead use the concept as analytical tool to synthesize the three existing approaches to partisanship.

-- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --

² An additional advantage of moving away from party identification as a key variable is that the concept is much more portable for comparative study. Many countries simply do not have a tradition of using the phrase “I am an X” when referring to a party, and would instead say “I am a supporter of X”. Partisanship, or the proclivity to prefer a political party all else being equal, is, in contrast, a universal characteristic that could be found in any party system.

As Figure 1 lays out, we can conceive of the three dominant approaches all explaining ways in which individuals can gain confidence in their ability to figure out where they fit in the political world of their particular time and circumstance. Certainly, a psychological identification with a particular party ought to give one great confidence in being sure that one has chosen the correct political party to support, even if one knows little about the party's policies or past performance. Similarly, a belief that a party represents people like me could lead to this kind of confidence, even absent a psychological belief that supporting that party is part of one's identity. Likewise, absent a psychological attachment to a political party or a clear belief about how much one resembles the typical supporter of that party, we could expect a better understanding of where parties stand on critical issues would increase one's confidence that there is a party towards which one should be predisposed to support.

In addition to providing a common framework for synthesizing much of the existing literature on partisanship, our approach also offers two exciting directions for moving the partisanship literature forward, especially as we consider the task of moving this literature out of the United States and into the rest of the world. First, it offers as an analytical tool – and requires that we pay attention to – the issue of political context. For example, in countries where parties are closely aligned with particular ethnic groups and focus on delivering patronage to those ethnic groups, it may be that the social identity branch in Figure 1 completely dominates the other two. Thus, if we want to understand variation in the prevalence and strength of partisanship across individuals in these types of countries, we will want to focus on those who have an easier time identifying who the supporters of particular parties are and who they themselves “are” (e.g., we might expect stronger partisanship in people whose ethnic identity is clearer). Alternatively, in newly competitive party systems where parties are not closely

identified with ethnic groups and psychological attachments to parties have not yet set in, we might expect people with a better understanding of the stance of political parties on major issues to be more partisan. We of course can not go through every iteration of possible context here, but the general point is that context can and ought to be incorporated into the theorizing process.

Second, if we are correct that confidence in one's place in the political world is the proximate variable to possessing a predisposition to support a particular political party, then it opens up the possibility that other factors besides those stressed by the three main existing schools could effect partisanship as well. Elsewhere, for example, we have found that prior voting experience was associated with higher levels of partisanship in Russia in the 1990s (Brader and Tucker 2008); this suggests that perhaps political experience could form another pathway to increasing one's confidence in one's ability to navigate the political process. In this paper, we will suggest that political embarrassment, and more specifically the revelation that you know less about political parties than you might have thought you did, could serve to decrease confidence and thus depress partisanship.

The purpose of this particular paper is not to address every theoretical issue raised by our proposed way for thinking about theories of partisanship in a comparative context. Instead, we introduce the overall approach here as a means of motivating hypotheses for the current study at hand. More specifically, here we are interested in the roll of information on the formation of partisanship in post-communist countries. The framework we have introduced in this section helps us in this task in three ways. First, it motivates our interest in information: in a new democracy, we might expect full blown psychological identification and clear beliefs about the social profiles of supporters of new parties to be less prevalent than in established democracies, thus potentially highlighting the importance of the information based approach of the rational

revisionist school. Second, it forces us to consider the context in which information might matter differently to residents of different post-communist countries, a task we take up below. Finally, it suggests that while more information about political parties might certainly strengthen partisanship in the manner suggested by the rational revisionist pathway, it is also possible that exposure to certain information could actually weaken partisanship instead through the political embarrassment pathway mentioned previously, a point we also take up in the following section.

Hypotheses: Information, Opinion, and Partisanship

Our overall goal is to understand better how and why voters develop partisanship in general, irrespective of the party preferred.³ To address this task broadly, we will need to examine the development of partisanship across a wide range of political contexts and with an eye towards examining the importance of many different factors. For example, past research in the United States has pointed to the importance of parental partisanship (Achen 2002; Greenstein 1965; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and Bower 2001), political engagement (Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings, Stoker, and Bower 2001; Shively 1979), and the habituation of attachment that often comes with age (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969). While all of these would make an interesting basis of inquiry concerning the initial development of partisanship in new democracies, in this paper we concentrate on a line of theoretical argument emanating from the rational revisionist school arguing that individuals can develop partisanship on the basis of information about the policies or performance of parties (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981; Franklin 1984; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jackson 1975; MacKuen et al. 1989). From this perspective,

³ This is not to say that explanations for general partisanship and particular partisan identities are unrelated. Parties may generate distinct means by which citizens become partisans. Nonetheless, the attempt to explain why an individual identifies with the nationalist party and not the social democratic party needs to be distinguished from the attempt to explain why some nationalist or social democratic party voters are identifiers and others are not.

citizens judge the differential benefits of competing parties and update accordingly.⁴ Simply put, we ought to expect that, on average, if citizens know more about political parties, they ought to be more confident in their ability to ascertain which party they ought to consistently prefer. Using the language of spatial models of utility, we ought to expect more information about the positions of political parties to allow voters to reduce their uncertainty over where parties are positioned, and thus make more accurate calculations over which party can provide them with the highest utility. If we assume that partisanship kicks in when voters are sufficiently confident that they can make this calculation correctly, then more information about the positions of political parties should result in a greater likelihood of partisanship in any given individual.⁵

We have previously found support for such claims in survey data from a Russian national election study (Brader and Tucker 2008), and have subsequently replicated this finding in unpublished work using survey data from the Polish National Election Studies as well. Nonetheless, if partisanship potentially affects issue opinions (Van Houweling and Sniderman 2005) and issue opinions potentially affect partisanship, it is difficult to conclusively verify such claims with correlational (survey) data. When causal claims are in doubt, scientists typically turn to experimental evidence for illumination. Not so in the study of party identification. Many scholars likely have been deterred by their belief that party identification changes only rarely and slowly, thus making it difficult to observe short-term changes during an experiment. However,

⁴ Although this view is associated with rational models, scholars in the social psychological tradition recognize that issues and performance can affect party ID, especially among young adults (Campbell et al. 1960; Niemi and Jennings 1991).

⁵ The one exception here is when more information leads a voter to realize that there is no party that provides the highest utility for her. From a purely spatial perspective, this is only the case when a voter learns that she is positioned equally between two parties. Thus it is possible that a voter who mistakenly believes she is close to one party could update based on new information to learn that she is really positioned equally between two parties. While this particular scenario is unlikely, if we assume partisanship kicks in when a citizen passes some “threshold of certainty”, e.g., that they have to be sure utility from party A exceeds utility from all other parties by some fixed amount θ , then it is possible that in some cases additional information will lead people who think that their utility from party A currently exceeds utility from all other parties by greater than θ will come to realize that this is not actually the case. We can not categorically rule out that this is happening, but note that this should only apply to some small sub-section of cases and that it would bias us *against* finding support for our hypotheses.

even those who believe short-term updating occurs have not made their case with experimental evidence. The only exception seems to confirm these suspicions: Cowden and McDermott (2000) run two experiments on U.S. college students to test the impact of short-term forces.⁶ Neither voting defections nor advocacy for/against presidential impeachment significantly affects party identification, despite plenty of movement in party choice.

Returning to the framework proposed in the previous section, however, we might suspect that in an established democracy like the United States it would be particularly hard to find evidence that small amounts of information about party positions could move a well entrenched sense of partisanship. With this in mind, the post-communist context presents a potentially more fruitful arena for an experimental test of the effect of information on partisanship for two reasons. First, we would suspect that 15 years in to multi-party political competition, partisanship ought to be less firmly entrenched in citizens than in the third century of democracy in the United States. Second, with more and newer political parties crowding the political spectrum, we similarly would expect less overall knowledge about the positions of political parties than in the United States, thus potentially magnifying the value of providing information to subjects as part of an experimental study. Thus we designed and implemented such an experimental study (details provided below) in three post-communist countries.

However, even within the post-communist world there remains substantial variation across both individuals and political context. Thus while we in general we would expect more information about political parties to lead to more partisanship, we can produce more nuanced hypotheses by taking account of this variation. In terms of political context, it seems prudent to consider both the *stability* of the party system and the *relevance* of political parties. The more

⁶ To the best of our knowledge, this is the only published experimental research to test the impact of any potential explanatory factor on party identification.

stable the party system, the more information we might expect citizens to have about political parties prior to our experiment. (Indeed, this is precisely the logic that led us to the post-communist context in the first place: an assumption that citizens know less about parties generally because multi-party competition only appeared on the scene in the previous decade). It also seems safe to assume that the less relevant political parties are to the political process, the less we ought to expect voters to be paying attention to what parties are doing, and all else being equal, the less they would know about parties as well.

But of course all is not always equal, and even within any particular post-communist political system we would expect different individuals to react to more information about political parties differently. While there are of course potentially limitless ways to think about variation across individuals, we examine variation in *political sophistication* because of its close ties to our expectations about both what use information will have to citizens and how they will be able to process it. Prior research shows that political sophistication moderates political decision making and attitude change in general (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992; but see Goren 2004; Rahn et al. 1990). This line of work suggests political sophisticates or experts are better able and more likely to engage in complex reasoning, apply abstract ideals, or draw appropriate inferences than their less sophisticated fellow citizens. Scholars also have invoked the importance of individual aptitude, whether political sophistication or more general cognitive abilities imparted by education, when discussing partisanship. Downs posits party labels as cues that enable voters to choose among candidates despite incentives for rational ignorance (Downs 1957). Building on this perspective, Shively poses the “decisional function” hypothesis: The fewer “resources” a voter possesses to “pay the costs” of information (e.g.,

about issues and party performance) needed to make an electoral choice, the more likely she is to acquire a party identification (Shively 1979). If partisanship works as a decision-making crutch for those who lack information, then we would expect informationally-handicapped voters to depend on it most. Decades of empirical research, however, seem to point in the opposite direction: The best informed and most engaged citizens are also the most partisan (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996). Greater expertise may facilitate the formation of party identification, rather than render it unnecessary (Huber et al. 2005; Brader and Tucker 2008). Although sophisticated voters expose themselves more frequently to information that could change their preferences, the repository of prior information that undergirds their predispositions is many times larger than among the less informed (Achen 2002; Converse 1962; Fiorina 1981; Zaller 1992). Finally, Lodge and Hamill (1986) demonstrate that partisan sophisticates show better memory for partisan information but also exhibit stronger partisan biases in which information is recalled.

We expect political sophistication to affect whether and how citizens update their party identification in response to reasoned evaluation of the policy positions of parties. How exactly political sophistication might do this, however, is an open question. On the one hand, skepticism about this model of partisan learning is rooted in the sense that it involves greater effort than most citizens are willing and able to devote to the politics. This would lead us to believe that citizens who possess greater political expertise should also possess the motivation and effort to update their party identification on the basis of policy information. Conversely, though, we might expect that additional information about the policy positions of parties – particularly of the limited nature we are able to present in an experimental setting – might have little to offer those who are already well informed about politics. From this framework, we might expect

information to have the largest impact on precisely those who know the least about the political process. Still another logical hypothesis might be that new information would have little to offer the most sophisticated (they already know more than we can tell them) or the least sophisticated (they don't know enough to really make sense of what we are telling them), but would be of value to mid-range sophisticates who know enough to make sense of what we tell them but not so much that the new information does not have additional value to them.

-- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --

For the our current purposes, though, we want to consider the interaction of political sophistication and political context. Table 1 therefore concisely summarizes a set of reasonable expectations from interacting these factors. In all cases, we expect information to have a positive impact on the prevalence of partisanship; this effect, however, is likely to be felt differently by different segments of the population in different contexts. For cases when parties are both important and stable, we expect that high sophisticates are likely to have little left to learn about political parties relative to other citizens (e.g., the most similar to citizens in the United States) and that low sophisticates are probably low sophisticates because they have actively chosen not to be interested in politics (or not very capable of processing information). Mid-range sophisticates, however, most likely have enough of an interest in politics to care about additional information, but are unlikely to have too much knowledge so as to find supplemental information lacking in value. Thus we expect a curvilinear relationship for the effect of information on partisanship in these contexts, with the strongest effects being felt by mid-range sophisticates.

In contrast, where party stability is lower but parties are still relevant, we might expect the cognitive ability to process information to play a larger role. We expect these types of situations to be characterized by a population that is paying attention to politics, but lacking in the kind of

stable foundations of partisan information that would be found in a situation where parties are more stable. In these cases, we might expect everyone to benefit from more information about political parties, but we similarly might expect the high sophisticates, who are better able to process the additional information, to register more of an effect than the mid sophisticates and then, in turn, the low sophisticates. Thus we expect a positive effect for information on partisanship, but increasing in strength in the level of political sophistication of the subject.

Finally, in political contexts where parties are stable but less relevant to the political process, we might expect that the role of providing information to subjects will primarily be to remind them of their opinions concerning political parties. If this is the case, then we again should expect a positive effect for information on partisanship, but there would be no real reason to expect it to vary markedly across level of *a priori* political knowledge. Thus we predict a positive effect for information on partisanship, without any real interaction across levels of political sophistication.

We have left the lower right hand corner of Table 1 blank because we do not have a clear prediction for low relevance and low stability parties. Our best guess is that the effect should be fairly similar to the low stability, high relevance category, but as we do not have a case in this quadrant for now, we set this question aside for the time-being.

Case Selection

Given the theoretical setup of the previous section, we conducted experiments in three post-communist countries, one for each of the three quadrants of Table 1 for which we have predictions. As illustrated in Table 2, our high stability / high relevance case is Hungary, a parliamentary system, where parties are both crucial to the functioning of the government and

have been remarkably stable by the standards of the region since the collapse of communism. Indeed, since the 1994 Hungarian parliamentary elections, the government has essentially been formed by one of two stable coalitions. Moreover, the four largest parties in Hungary have, with the exception of some minor name changes, all contested all of the national elections in Hungary since the collapse of communism.

-- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --

Our low stability / high relevance case is Poland, where the president is more powerful than his or her Hungarian counterpart, but the government is still formed by parliamentary majority and thus parties play a critical role. In contrast to Hungary, however, Poland has had one of the most unstable party systems in the world, let alone in the post-communist countries (Markowski and Tucker 2007). In particular, Poland went through a major political upheaval around the time of 2001 election, which resulted in four parties (out of six) entering the parliament for the first time. The same six parties returned following the 2005 election, with the three top finishers all from the new group of parties.

Our high stability but low relevance case is Russia. In contrast to both Hungary and Poland, Russia is a super-presidential system (Easter 1997; Fish 2000), with even more powers concentrated in the hands of the president recently. Moreover, all three Russian presidents to date, while clearly linked to a “party of power” (Colton and McFaul 2000; Tucker 2006, ch.4), have chosen not to affiliate openly with a party, let alone expend much resources on party building. Moreover, as more questions are raised about the democratic status of Russia – Freedom House recently returned Russia into the “not-Free” category – the relevance of political parties becomes more doubtful. Nevertheless, a few Russian parties have been regularly

contesting elections for close to a decade and a half.⁷ Panel data confirms that many Russians still identify with parties, but show little stability in their party attachments (Colton and Hale 2005). All of this heightens Russia's value as a limiting case for partisan relevance within systems that have multi-party elections.

Experimental Design

The goal of our analysis was to measure the effect the effect of a treatment of “information” about political parties on partisanship. Following Zaller (1992), we sought to deliver “information” in two different ways. The first, and most obvious, is *external information*, which meant actually giving information to the subject. However, we can also think about reminding a subject about his or her own *internal information*. This type of treatment is aimed not at providing new information to a subject, but rather “bringing to the top of her head” information that she already possesses. Accordingly, our study employs a 2×2 design that manipulates exposure to information about the policy stances of the parties (the *information* manipulation, designed to provide *external information*) and an evaluation by the subject of the relative positions of the parties on policy issues (the *evaluation* manipulation, designed to access *internal information*). Our experiments are imbedded in standard public opinion surveys that (described in more detail in the following section). Accordingly, the members of the treatment and control groups receive different versions of the survey, which is the means by which our treatments are delivered. Readers should note that the two manipulations are independent of one and other (e.g., the experiment is fully factorialized).

⁷ This number would be larger if we included the generic “pro-government party” in each election. While this party changes from election to election, there has always been one and it has tended to offer a similar message across elections (Tucker 2006).

The stimulus for the *information* manipulation consisted of a card that interviewers handed to respondents, while saying:

Here is some information about a number of major political parties in Russia today. Please read over this information now, and then I will ask you some questions about these political parties. Please let me know when you are done reading over the card and I will continue.

Half of the respondents were randomly assigned to receive a card that contained policy information about the most important political parties in the country (six in Poland and Russia; four in Hungary) the other half were assigned to receive a card that lacked this information.⁸ Both cards listed the name, symbol, and leader of each of the parties. The policy information card also contained a bullet point list of short phrases indicating the major policy positions, goals, and ideological outlook of each party, which we drew from their own public materials and assessments of experts. Appendix I contains example of cards received by the treatment groups in all three countries translated into English, as well as one example of the design of a card received by a member of the control group (in this case in Russia).

Note two important features of this manipulation. First, the manipulation of information takes the form of balanced information about policy positions. With this design, we want to observe whether exposing citizens to policy-related information that accurately reflects the views of all the major parties (at least as the parties see themselves) assists them in identifying a party that best represents their interests and thereby causes them to update their partisanship accordingly. We see this as consistent with those rational policy models that focus more heavily on the comparison of policy positions and expected policy benefits (Achen 1989, 1992; Franklin

⁸ While in an ideal world we would have liked to have had the exact same number of parties described in each country, it was simply not feasible given the political landscapes of the different country.

and Jackson 1983).⁹ The second feature of this manipulation to notice is that the information is fairly general in nature and modest in amount. The stimulus in this sense is not very powerful, especially compared to what voters may potentially be exposed to during the course of election campaigns. However, it is closer to the volume and generality of information that a broader share of the electorate should be willing and able to digest in a short time period. In this vein, our expectation is that the experiment is capturing a snap shot of what occurs repeatedly over time outside of the laboratory. In the “lab”, we are exposing some people to a moderate amount of information and then checking to see whether it affects their partisanship over a very short time period. Outside of the lab we expect that some people are exposed to much more information about the policy positions of parties over time than others, and that correspondingly their likelihood of developing a sense of partisanship over time will be that much stronger

The second manipulation is the *evaluation task*. Respondents were randomly assigned to receive the task or not. For the evaluation task, interviewers asked respondents to place all six major parties on a seven-point scale for each of three specific policy issues (see Appendix II for an example). After placing each party, respondents then place themselves on the same scale. This task is essentially identical to the sorts of standard survey items researchers use to test policy-based models with non-experimental data. Our goal was to examine what thinking through the policy placement of parties *vis a vis* oneself contributes to partisan learning beyond whatever thinking is prompted by mere exposure to the policy information. We are essentially forcing people to bring their own thoughts about parties’ policies “to the top of their heads” (Zaller 1992) and to reflect on the proximity of the major parties to their own views on those

⁹ An alternative design, perhaps more in line with Fiorina’s (1981) model, could be used to assess the impact of performance information that suggests greater benefits come from one or more parties relative to the others. In that sort of design, the expectation would be for more party-specific directional effects as citizens move toward some parties and away from others.

policies. In a sense the first treatment provides respondents with policy information about parties from an external source (for some citizens this may be novel information, for others a reminder of what they knew previously), while the evaluation task “generates” information from an internal source by prompting respondents to consider what they believe about the positions of parties on policy issues.

At this point, though, it is important to consider a second way in which the evaluation task could affect partisanship. As introduced here, it is simply another way of using information to stimulate the subject, albeit internal as opposed to external information, and thus the hypotheses laid out in Table 1 ought to fold. However, it is possible that for people who do not know much about politics – our low sophisticates – the experience of the evaluation treatment will instead serve to remind voters how little they actually know about politics. Thus we might expect that this treatment could in fact *decrease* a respondent’s confidence in her ability to correctly navigate the political landscape, and therefore could result in a decrease in partisanship.¹⁰ We will therefore consider this an alternative “political embarrassment” hypothesis.

Our evidence comes from survey experiments carried out in Russia during the spring of 2006, Poland in the summer of 2006, and Hungary in the summer of 2007. In all three cases, we worked with preeminent professional polling firms in each country: the Levada Center in Russia; the Center for Public Opinion (CBOS) in Poland, and Ipsos-Szonda in Hungary. The Russian and Hungarian surveys were conducted on probability samples of approximately 400 adult citizens in Moscow (402) and Hungary (409); the Polish survey was conducted using a national probability sample of 607 adult citizens throughout the country; we will have a great deal more to say about the distinction between the Polish national sample and the Russian/Hungarian

¹⁰ While one could argue that reading about policy positions could have a similar impact, we believe the embarrassment from being unable to answer questions – or from seeing that one shares no positions in common with the party one thought was one’s most preferred party – is likely to have a more dramatic effect.

metropolitan area samples in the following section. All of the surveys were conducted face-to-face in respondents' homes, and were designed to take little more than an hour. Respondents were given a short set of questions as a pre-test, then presented with either the treatment or control for the *information* manipulation, then either presented with *evaluation* manipulation or not, then given a battery of additional questions as part of a post-test. All of our dependent variables are included as part of the post-test.¹¹

Measuring Partisanship

To measure partisanship, we pursue a strategy both here and elsewhere (Brader and Tucker 2001, 2008) that relies on multiple indicators of partisanship out of the belief that there simply is no “best” measure of partisanship in the context of newly competitive political systems. We do not necessarily presuppose that one is better than the others, but rather hope to use consistent results across multiple measures as stronger evidence.

More specifically, we use five related measures of partisanship. The first, which we shall refer to as “self-id”, is an adaptation of the traditional American National Election Studies (ANES) measure modified for use in post-communist Russian election studies (Colton 2000; Colton and McFaul 2003):

Please tell me, is there any one among the present parties, movements, and associations about which you would say, ‘This is my party, my movement, or my association’?

[IF YES:] Which party, movement, or association is that? Please name it for me. To what degree does this party, movement, or association reflect your interests, views, and concerns?

[IF NO:] Please tell me, does there exist a party, movement, or association which more than the others reflects your interests, views, and concerns? [IF YES:] Which party, movement, or association would that be? Please name it for me.

¹¹ There is actually a second experiment on the effects of partisanship as an independent variable (looking specifically at the effects of partisan cues) that is included towards the end of the post-test. We report on this experiment in a separate paper.

The second is the *party closeness* measure – we will refer to this as “close-ID” that has been used in numerous countries and has been part of the cross-national Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project:

Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party, movement, or association?

[IF YES:] Which party, movement, or association is that? Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?

[IF NO:] Is there a party to which you feel yourself a little closer than to the others? [IF YES:] Which party is that? Name it, please. Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?

From both measures, we also construct four-point scales (0-3) to capture the strength of partisanship; we call these variables “self-strength” and “close-strength”. Finally, we use perhaps the single lowest threshold of partisanship that we could come up with: when presented with a list of parties, could respondents pick out a party they liked best (or, failing that, that they liked least then all other parties). We refer to this as the “party-like” variable.¹²

One important point to make about these measures is that we should in no way think of them as five separate and independent “tests” of the level of partisanship. Clearly, each strength variable is directly related to one of the dichotomous variable, so we can not claim that these are truly separate measures. But more fundamentally, we have to be aware of the fact that in asking similar questions about parties within the context of the same survey, there may be a tendency for people to want to give consistent answers. That being said, there is variation in the answers

¹² For reasons related to another experiment contained in the study on which we do not report here, we actually asked respondents to pick from a list of the major parties. So it is possible that our measure missed people who did have a preference for a party not on the list. Nevertheless, since we only provided information and/or asked respondents to evaluate the major parties, we wouldn’t necessarily have expected a treatment effect on partisans of minor parties from our design. Either way, as long as these “minor party partisans” are evenly distributed across our control and treatment groups – which we would expect them to be from the research design – their presence should not bias our experiment in one way or another. It would, however, suggest that one should use caution in extrapolating from this measure among the sample population to the general population.

we find across the different measures, and we see no reason to at this point anoint one of these variables the preferred measure of partisanship and eschew the reporting of the others. So we offer these different measures merely as a way of taking multiple but related ways of tapping into the same basic underlying concept.¹³

Method of Analysis

There are a variety of different ways that we could present the results of our experiments. The most common approach to reporting experimental results in psychology or political psychology studies is generally to report mean differences across experimental groups and the significance of main effects and interaction effects through t-tests and analyses of variance. In experimental economics, scholars seem to lean more towards reporting regression results, where the treatment is included as one independent variable along with other relevant control variables. However, as there is no easy intuitive way to interpret coefficients from non-linear models (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), especially when one is including interactive variables in the model (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005), a third option is to report the marginal effects of a first difference, whereby we hold control variables at their mean or median and calculate the predicted change in either the predicted value of the dependent value (for the strength variables) or the predicted likelihood in expressing partisanship (for the dichotomous partisanship variables). We adopt the third approach in this paper because it combines the confidence of including control variables in our analysis with the ease of understanding that comes with reporting marginal effects. However, to be perfectly clear, the choice of how to present the

¹³ Were we interested in measuring, for example, whether more people felt there was a party about which they could say this is “my party” than a party that is close to them, then it would have behooved us to reverse the ordering of the questions on different surveys. Given that our goal is not to assess these variables comparatively but instead to just use them as multiple measures of the same concept, we did not choose to design the study in this manner.

results has no impact on the substantive conclusions. When we examine t-tests or regression tables, we come to the same general conclusions.

More specifically, we employ a logit model for the dichotomous variables, least-squares regression for the strength variables, and the *Clarify 2.1* software suite in conjunction with *Stata 9.2* to calculate our marginal effects. The control variables included in the models are age, age-squared, dummy variables for education (post-secondary, secondary, and less than secondary, with less than secondary serving as the omitted category) and, in the Polish analyses, dummy variables for residence (city, town, and village, with village serving as the omitted category). The actual regression results can be found in Appendix III.

Empirical Results

We organize the presentation of the empirical results in this section in the following manner. First, we present a simple analysis of the results of each treatment across the entire sample by country. Next, we break down the results by treatment and by country and present the effects of the treatment by different levels of political sophistication. To do so, we divide each country sample roughly into thirds by country on the basis of a political knowledge scale as is standard in much prior research on public opinion (e.g., see Zaller 1992).¹⁴ In the final section, we probe in

¹⁴ Respondents were asked to place several members of the government with their correct position, a number of factual questions about political institutions, and to name the parties currently in the parliament. Respondents receive one point for each correct answer, and then are split into thirds within their respective countries on the basis of how many questions were answered correctly. An alternative approach would have been to pool the entire sample by level of political knowledge and then split respondents into thirds this way. This would have resulted in more high sophisticates in Hungary and Poland and more low sophisticates in Russia. While we do not rule out this sort of an analysis in the future, we remain uncomfortable with assuming the difficulty of our questions designed to measure political sophistication is constant across countries. By limiting our categorization of political sophistication to within country variation, we can eliminate this concern (as even if the questions were harder in one country than the other, they will still sort respondents within those countries into the correct third in terms of political knowledge).

more detail the regional variations in the effect of our treatment in Poland, which is our only case where the experiment was carried out both within and outside of the capital city.

Information and Evaluation Treatments

Figure 2 presents the results of our *information* treatment. The height of each bar in the figure with the dichotomous dependent variables (the left-hand side) refers to the increase in likelihood of expressing partisanship in the presence of the information treatment for an average respondent. The height of each bar in the figure with the strength variables (right-hand side) refers to the increase in predicted strength from receiving the treatment for any respondent on a four point (0-3) scale.¹⁵

-- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE --

We can make three observations concerning Figure 2. First, in general, more information leads to more partisanship in Russia and Hungary. Second, the results are clearly strongest in Russia. For the dichotomous variables, Russians receiving the treatment are as much as 10% more likely to express partisanship than those who did not receive the treatment. Conversely, in Poland there is no real evidence of the treatment having much of an effect at all.

-- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE --

Figure 3 presents the results from the *evaluation* treatment, revealing a markedly different set of findings.¹⁶ First, to the extent that there are any significant effects for the evaluation treatment, they tend to be negative. In other words, evaluating where parties stand makes people less likely to express partisan sentiment or to express lower levels of partisanship. This finding

¹⁵ Since we employ a linear regression model for the strength variables, the setting of the other independent variables has no effect upon the predicted size of the first difference.

¹⁶ Here we consider only the effects of the two treatments individually. Our initial assessment of the Russian experiment showed no additional effect from the treatments working interactively, but we will explore this topic more thoroughly in the future.

stands in contrast to our initial expectation that evaluation of party positions would strengthen feelings of partisanship. That being said, the second important observation from the figure is that the strongest and most consistent negative findings come from Hungary. While the other countries trend negative, they are not as consistent as the Hungarian variables, nor are they as large.

Having looked at the effects of the treatments on a country by country basis, we now turn to looking at the interaction of political sophistication with our treatments.

Information Treatment and Political Sophistication

-- INSERT FIGURE 4a, 4b, 4c ABOUT HERE --

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Figure 4 is that there are indeed different patterns across the three countries. Both Russia and Hungary have fairly clear results. In Russia, we find a consistent positive effect for the information treatment regardless of the subject's level of political sophistication. While the bars are not all of the exact same height, there is no particular pattern across the sophistication levels and the effects are all positive. So consistent with our expectation for the high-stability/low-relevance case, there seems to be a positive effect for information on partisanship regardless of level of political sophistication.

In the Hungarian study, however, we see clear evidence of a curvilinear effect. The information treatment has little effect upon low sophisticates *and* upon high sophisticates, but apparently has a large positive effect upon mid-range sophisticates. So again, we find evidence that is consistent with expectation: for our high stability / high relevance case, the effect of information on partisanship is pronounced and positive, but only for mid-level sophisticates.

Poland, by contrast, shows both inconsistent and substantively small effects. Moreover, there is just absolutely no evidence that these effects are increasing in level of political sophistication.

Evaluation Treatment and Political Sophistication

-- INSERT FIGURES 5a, 5b, 5c ABOUT HERE --

We know from the country by country figures that overall, the evaluation treatment forces partisanship downwards, quite contrary to our initial expectations. Thus it is not surprising the Figure 5 reveals no support for our original information hypotheses presented in Table 1. We do not have partisanship increasing uniformly across sophistication level in Russia; we do not find it increasing in a curvilinear fashion in Hungary, and we do not find it increasing across levels of political sophistication in Poland.

However, given the positive support we found for our hypotheses in Hungary and Russia with the more traditional “external information” cue, it seems more likely that the problem was with the idea of stimulating “internal information” using the evaluation task than with the general theoretical arguments about the effect of information on partisanship. Indeed, when we turn instead to the political embarrassment hypothesis, we find strong support for it across the board. In every country, low sophisticates who are exposed to the evaluation cue have lower levels of partisanship than the control group. Moreover in Russia, it is only low sophisticates who respond that way. In Poland, the effect is largely found in low sophisticates. Only in Hungary do we see this effect permeating across all three levels of sophisticates, although even here it is apparently strongest among low sophisticates.¹⁷ But taken together, the results provide very

¹⁷ One possible – and here we really stress “possible” – explanation for this finding could be that years of alternative coalitions – with either Fidesz and MDF in power or MSZP and SzDSz in power – may have obscured respondent’s

clear support for the prediction of the “embarrassment hypothesis” that forcing low sophisticates to test their knowledge of the issue stances of political parties could result in lower levels of reported partisanship

The Polish Puzzle

One other pattern that is apparent from all of the figures is that for some reason, the experimental treatments seem to be having less of an effect across the board in Poland. Recall, however, that the Polish experiment is the only one that was conducted using a national sample. Figure 6 therefore presents the Polish results broken down by whether or not a respondent lived in a village, town, or city.¹⁸

INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

Figure 6 seems to provide an important clue to the puzzle of why the Polish results look so different from the Hungarian and Russian results. When we look at just residents of Polish cities, the effects of the information cue is indeed positive as we expected it to be. If not with as substantively large an effect, at least the information treatment in Polish cities is having a positive effect on levels of partisanship. So perhaps the Polish results were simply illuminating an important difference between the role of information in cities (and perhaps even capital cities at that) and outside of cities. While interesting (and puzzling) unto itself, this is unfortunately not the end of the story. Figure 7 breaks down the effect of the information cue in Polish cities

abilities to tell the differences between these parties. Thus high and medium sophisticates could have a rational, issue-based reason for preferring one of these coalitions to the other, and could have a standing decision to prefer one party in the coalition to the other. Yet, when we force people to actually think about where parties stand, perhaps respondents realize that it is hard to distinguish the coalition members from one another, and therefore we see a drop in partisanship for all levels of sophistication.

¹⁸ We focus here only on the information cue in this section because there is nothing particularly interesting about breaking down the evaluation cue by residence.

by political sophistication.¹⁹ (Note that the interaction of the information cue and being in the middle-third sophisticate category perfectly predicts “party-like” when we limit ourselves to city residents, so we don’t have an estimate for this variable.)

-- INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE --

The result is very clear evidence of a third pattern, and not the one that we had expected: in Polish cities, the information cue has the strongest positive effect on low sophisticates. Indeed, this pattern is largely the opposite of what we had expected to see: the positive effect of information on partisanship is *decreasing* with level of political sophistication.

Discussion

This study yields several important findings about the relationship between partisanship and policy information in the context of newly competitive post-communist political systems. First, despite the prevailing skepticism about rational policy models of partisan learning, some citizens update their feelings of partisanship in light of information about the policy positions of parties. Second, and more importantly, the impact on partisanship depends critically on political context and political sophistication. In a stable party system where parties are relevant to the political process, information has the largest effect on mid-level sophisticates. In Moscow, where parties are bordering on irrelevant, the information treatment increases the partisanship of all levels of sophisticates. And in Polish cities, where parties are important and have been extremely unstable, information about parties has a very strong effect on the partisanship of low sophisticates. The first two of these findings are consistent with our expectations; the last one is not. Nevertheless, all three highlight one of the main points we hoped to make in this paper:

¹⁹ As calculating the marginal effects of the treatment cue in Polish cities by political sophistication involves a triple interaction effect, we for now report marginal effects from regression analyses involving only residents of Polish cities.

determinants of partisanship are likely to be at least in part a function of political context, and therefore are likely to vary cross-nationally.²⁰

In contrast, we have at least one fairly constant finding regarding the effect of evaluation on partisanship that seems relatively robust to political context: across all three countries, the less politically sophisticated feel less partisan after having been forced to think through where political parties stand on major policy dimensions.²¹ Additionally, this negative effect of the evaluation treatment is always strongest among the least sophisticated third of the sample; in some cases (in particular Russia), the evaluation task actually strengthens partisanship for the most politically sophisticated. While inconsistent with our predictions when viewed through the lens of evaluation as an “internal information” cue, these findings are in fact quite consistent with the idea that the evaluation cue could reduce the confidence of low sophisticates in the validity of whatever partisan proclivity they might have held prior to the experiment.

Stepping back then, we believe this evidence suggests the possibility that there may be two distinct types of partisans—a more reflective set of partisans who acquire and update their partisanship, at least in part, on the evaluation of policy differences across parties, and a relatively unreflective set of partisans whose presumably more symbolic attachment to parties is undermined when asked to evaluate policy differences they are poorly equipped and motivated to consider.

This study is a first step in our effort to shore up a wealth of correlational evidence on the origins and effects of party identification with more secure experimental foundations. More analysis of these experiments awaits, including (1) assessments of the impact of our treatments on other measures of partisanship, such as partisan attitude constraint, social identification with

²⁰ Although on a very different substantive topic, this is a similar big picture conclusion to Huber et al. 2005.

²¹ Strikingly, these results parallel findings from a series of pilot studies of the experiments that we conducted on American college students.

parties, and readiness for political action (2) alternative means of modeling political sophistication, either as a continuous variable or with levels of political sophistication assigned across the whole sample; (3) empirical tests of other observable implications of our explanations for some of the differences in our current findings; and (4) exploring the effects of the two experiments interactively with one another. We also are in the process of replicating these experiments in an established democracy – Great Britain – this spring. Finally, we are seeking out funding to carry out different experiments that test other key propositions about the determinants of party identification, such as political engagement or the crystallization of commitment through political action.

Table 1. Hypotheses of the Effects of Information on Partisanship

	Party Relevance	
	Higher	Lower
Higher Party Stability	+ Partisanship, Curvilinear with Political Knowledge	+ Partisanship, All levels of Political Knowledge
Lower Party Stability	+ Partisanship, Increasing in Political Knowledge	???

Table 2. Case Selection

	Party Relevance	
	Higher	Lower
Higher Party Stability	Hungary	Russia
Lower Party Stability	Poland	X

Figure 1: A Synthetic Approach to Partisanship





Figure 2: Information Treatment by Country

Marginal Effects of Information Treatment by Country



Marginal Effects of Information Treatment by Country





Figure 3: Evaluation Treatment by Country

Marginal Effects of Evaluation Cue by Country



Marginal Effects of Evaluation Cue by Country




Figure 4a: Marginal Effect of Information Treatment by Political Sophistication in Russia




Figure 4b: Marginal Effect of Information Treatment by Political Sophistication in Hungary




Figure 4c: Marginal Effect of Information Treatment by Political Sophistication in Poland




Figure 5a: Marginal Effect of Evaluation Treatment by Political Sophistication in Russia




Figure 5b: Marginal Effect of Evaluation Treatment by Political Sophistication in Hungary




Figure 5c: Marginal Effect of Evaluation Treatment by Political Sophistication in Poland





Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Information Treatment by Residence in Poland





Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Information Treatment by Political Sophistication in Polish Cities



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APPENDIX I: Information Treatment



The Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Leader: Genadii Zyuganov

- Retains communist ideals
- Supports a socialist-market economy
- Protects the interests of the working class
- Favors state control of oil and gas companies
- Party of Russian patriots
- Supports Russia as a great power
- Opposes the Euro-Atlantic alliance



Unified Russia

Leader: Boris Gryzlov

- Formed in 2001 by merger of Unity and Fatherland All Russia parties
- Neither a party of the left or right, but instead a pragmatic centrist party
- Supports strong presidential power to guarantee political stability
- Wants to reduce the size of the bureaucracy
- Seeks to provide the president with a working majority in the Duma to pass legislation
- Seeks to defend Russia's national interest without predispositions towards allying with or against particular countries



Yabloko

Leader: Grigory Yavlinsky

- Believes state must guarantee individual rights and freedoms
- Supports a new democratic course for Russia
- Supports a free civil society and a law-based state
- Advocates a market based economy, but believe state must ensure equality of opportunity by helping those that are worse off
- Believes Russia should seek to join the European Union and other European institutions
- Opposes war in Chechnya



Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

Leader: Vladimir Zhirinovskii

- Supports a very strong state
- Seeks to eliminate national republics
- Calls for Russian as a single national language
- Seeks reunification with Belarus, Ukraine, and other former Soviet Republics
- Strives for total victory of Russian patriotism against the ideology of Islamic revolution
- Supports free housing for pensioners and young families
- Wants to reform judicial system and institute tougher penalties for criminal acts
- Believes state must ensure law and order



The Union of Rightist Forces

Leaders: Boris Nemtsov, Nikita Belykh

- For a strong effective government
- Supports a competitive market economy
- Supports additional economic reforms
- Favors strong guarantees of private property
- Supports individual rights and personal freedoms
- Advocates freedom of the press
- Has proposed eliminating conscription and instituting a professional army
- Favors cooperation with the West when it is in Russia's interest



Motherland

Leaders: Dmitry Rogozin, Sergei Baburin, Sergei Glazev

- Social-patriotic party
- Support a very strong state
- Believes Russia must be vigilant against threats posed by foreigners, including Muslims and Zionists
- Strongly opposes illegal immigration
- Seeks to ensure social justices
- Believes minimum wage should be raised
- Supports renationalization of illegally privatized assets
- In favor of imprisoning corrupt oligarchs
- Strongly opposed monetization of social welfare payments



The Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Leader: Genadii Zyuganov



Yabloko

Leader: Grigory Yavlinsky



Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Leader: Vladimir Zhirinovskii



Unified Russia

Leader: Boris Gryzlov



The Union of Rightist Forces

Leaders: Boris Nemtsov,
Nikita Belykh



Motherland

Leaders: Dmitry Rogozin,
Sergei Baburin, Sergei Glazev



Citizen's Platform (PO)

Leader: Donald Tusk

Experts say this about the party:

- Created in 2001 from members of UW and AWS
- Supports liberal ideas and policies that assist private entrepreneurs and businesses while also fighting corruption
- Supports a free-market economy and the principle of competition
- Seeks to reduce tax burdens on Polish citizens and companies
- Strongly supports a flat tax
- Seeks to consolidate the Polish stance on the international political stage through alliances in the region, within the EU, and with the USA.
- Center-right party



Party of Law and Justice (PiS)

Leader: Jarosław Kaczyński

Experts say this about the party:

- Created in 2001 by many former members of AWS
- Favors a traditional social order
- Supports principal of law and order and a resolute fight against crime and corruption
- Supports a market economy but also believes in protecting those who are weaker economically
- Less interested in privatization and tax cuts than other center-right parties
- Supports integration with the EU, but not at the expense of Polish domestic interests
- Center-right party



Samoobrona RP (SRP)

Leader: Andrzej Lepper

Experts say this about the party:

- Created from the Samoobrona movement known for its public protests
- Supports policies designed to help the unemployed, former state farm workers and unskilled workers
- Opposed to payment of foreign debts
- Believes state should help fund agriculture
- Hostile towards foreign investment
- Does not oppose the EU, but believes Poland needs to be very careful about protecting its own interests
- Left-wing populist party



Polish Peasant Party (PSL)

Leader: Waldemar Pawlak

Experts say this about the party:

- "dominated by former members of the ZSL, a communist satellite party active from 1949 to 1989"
- Strongly supports subsidies for farmers and agricultural employees
- Has cooperated with a range of parties in government, including both post-communist and postsolidarity parties
- Although initially skeptical of EU membership, actively supports using EU funds to promote Polish agricultural interests.
- Agrarian party that considers itself centrist on other matters



Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)

Leader: Wojciech Olejniczak

Experts say this about the party:

- created by many former members of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR)
- Originally an electoral alliance of several social democratic groups led by the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, in 1999 re-organized and registered as a political party
- Strongly supported and oversaw Poland's accession to the EU
- Seeks to combine concern for working people with responsible state financial policy
- Headed government from 2001-2005
- Pursues pro-US foreign policy
- Member party of Party of European Socialists



League of Polish Families (LPR)

Leader: Roman Giertych

Experts say this about the party:

- Created in 2001 as a bloc of national-catholic parties and movements
- Favors high level of government intervention in the economy
- Opposes selling of land to foreigners
- Seeks to protect traditional values such as religion
- Opposes abortion and gay marriage
- Promotes policies based on the ideas of catholic conservatism
- One of the only organized groups in Poland that opposed EU membership
- Continues to be anti-EU
- Far right party with nationalist views



Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party(Fidesz)
Leaders: **Orbán Viktor, Kövér László**

Experts say this about the party:

A JÖVŐ SZÖVETSÉGE

- Fidesz was created in 1988 as anticommunist youth movement
- Party was renamed Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party in 1993 and people over 35 were allowed to join
- Controlled the government from 1998-2002
- Strongly supports remedying injustices faced by Hungarian communities in the region outside of Hungary
- Believes state should protect people's economic interests, and opposes changes to health care systems and pensions
- Has led street protests against government over past year
- Increasingly skeptical about benefits for Hungary of EU membership
- Since 1998, considered a conservative and nationalist party



Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)
Leaders: **Kóka János, Kuncze Gábor**

Experts say this about the party

- Founded in 1988 as a communist opposition party committed to democratic values, rights and liberties
- Supports a free-market economy and the principle of competition
- Support the importance of the rule of law
- Advocate of privatization and reducing budget deficits
- Supports the rights of minority groups within Hungary to participate in the political process
- Has served as a coalition partner of the MSzP in government from 1994-1998 and 2002-the present
- Has always been strongly identified as a liberal party



Hungarian Socialist Party
Leaders: **Gyurcsány Ferenc. Hiller István**

Experts say this about the party:

- Legal Successor to the communist Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, but renounced Marxism in 1989
- Supports liberal, free market policies
- Lead member of coalition governments from 1994-1998 and 2002-present
- Has in the past been associated with implementing austerity measures to restore fiscal discipline
- Believes government support should be targeted to the neediest members of society
- Opposed to extending Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary
- Strong supporter of Hungarian membership in the EU
- Considered a social-democratic party



Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)
Leaders: **Dávid Ibolya, Kálmán Katona**

Experts say this about the party:

- Established in 1988
- Christian, conservative party
- Led Hungary's first post-communist government from 1990-1994
- Concerned about the rights of Hungarian minorities living outside of Hungary
- Ran for office in coalition with Fidesz in 1998 and 2002, but decided to run separately from Fidesz in 2006
- Supports limited government, free markets, individual responsibility, individual freedom and Judeo-Christian values
- Supports contacts with right-wing American institutions


Appendix II: Example of Evaluation Question

C1. There is a lot of discussion today about matters of legality, law and order, corruption, and crime in Russia. Various points of view exist about how order should be brought about in our country. So what do you think about this? For example, some people believe that order should be introduced at all costs, even if the rights of citizens are violated. Supposed these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people believe that it is necessary to provide order in the country, but citizens rights must not be violated. Suppose that these people are at the other end of a scale at point 7. And, of course, some people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6


[INTERVIEWER: HAND THE RESPONDENT CARD 1.]

[KEY: (1) Order at all costs (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Order without violating rights (98) H/S (8) REF]

A. Please tell us where you would place the political parties on this scale. Where would you place the Communist Party of the Russian Federation?




B. How about Unified Russia?



C. Union of Right Forces?




D. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia?




E. Yabloko?



F. Motherland?



G. Now, please tell us where you would place **yourself** on this same scale?



APPENDIX III: REGRESSION RESULTS

A1. Information and Evaluation Treatment by Country

A2. Information and Evaluation Treatment Interacted with Knowledge by Country

A3. Information Interacted with Knowledge in Polish Cities

Table A1.1 Russia: Information Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	Closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Information Treatment	0.379*	0.330	0.534**	0.194*	0.107
	(0.211)	(0.217)	(0.247)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Age	0.014	0.033	0.043	-0.013	0.018
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age-Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	-0.390	-0.746	-2.169**	-0.245	-0.048
	(0.479)	(0.523)	(1.054)	(0.232)	(0.230)
Secondary Education	-0.065	-0.508	-2.177**	-0.026	0.051
	(0.468)	(0.513)	(1.046)	(0.226)	(0.225)
Constant	-0.271	0.176	2.051	1.135***	0.660*
	(0.825)	(0.859)	(1.294)	(0.403)	(0.400)
Observations	376	376	376	376	376
R-squared				0.03	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A1.2 Russia: Evaluation Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Evaluation	-0.088	-0.041	0.270	-0.117	0.011
Treatment	(0.211)	(0.217)	(0.246)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Age	0.017	0.036	0.056	-0.013	0.019
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age-Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	-0.329	-0.701	-2.179**	-0.201	-0.039
	(0.478)	(0.524)	(1.056)	(0.233)	(0.231)
Secondary Education	-0.034	-0.487	-2.207**	-0.000	0.054
	(0.468)	(0.514)	(1.048)	(0.227)	(0.225)
Constant	-0.154	0.249	1.890	1.249***	0.666
	(0.835)	(0.870)	(1.297)	(0.411)	(0.408)
Observations	376	376	376	376	376
R-squared				0.02	0.01

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A1.3 Hungary: Information Treatment

	(1) selfid	(2) Closeid	(3) partylike	(4) selfstr	(5) closestr1
Information Treatment	0.275 (0.205)	0.097 (0.209)	0.115 (0.243)	0.155 (0.111)	0.080 (0.113)
Age	0.017 (0.034)	-0.014 (0.034)	-0.048 (0.041)	0.005 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.019)
Age-Squared	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Higher Education	1.047*** (0.275)	0.867*** (0.282)	0.918*** (0.330)	0.521*** (0.148)	0.542*** (0.150)
Secondary Education	0.179 (0.263)	-0.022 (0.263)	0.206 (0.294)	0.077 (0.145)	0.104 (0.147)
Constant	-1.122 (0.855)	0.183 (0.860)	1.688* (1.025)	0.431 (0.463)	0.946** (0.470)
Observations	409	409	409	409	409
R-squared				0.05	0.06

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A1.4 Hungary: Evaluation Treatment

	(1) selfid	(2) Closeid	(3) partylike	(4) selfstr	(5) closestr1
Evaluation Treatment	-0.378* (0.205)	-0.411** (0.210)	-0.323 (0.244)	-0.155 (0.111)	-0.195* (0.112)
Age	0.018 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.034)	-0.048 (0.041)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.018)
Age-Squared	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Higher Education	1.061*** (0.276)	0.893*** (0.284)	0.934*** (0.331)	0.523*** (0.148)	0.549*** (0.150)
Secondary Education	0.225 (0.265)	0.019 (0.264)	0.241 (0.295)	0.096 (0.145)	0.124 (0.147)
Constant	-0.817 (0.858)	0.437 (0.866)	1.902* (1.032)	0.577 (0.465)	1.085** (0.471)
Observations	409	409	409	409	409
R-squared				0.05	0.06

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix A1.5 Poland: Information Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	Closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Information Treatment	0.042 (0.165)	-0.084 (0.174)	-0.196 (0.220)	0.026 (0.083)	-0.025 (0.058)
Age	0.051** (0.025)	0.053** (0.026)	0.083*** (0.031)	0.021 (0.013)	0.012 (0.009)
Age-Squared	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Higher Education	0.275 (0.257)	0.279 (0.272)	0.162 (0.339)	0.011 (0.128)	0.115 (0.090)
Secondary Education	0.191 (0.187)	0.279 (0.197)	0.510** (0.257)	0.036 (0.094)	0.139** (0.066)
Residence: City	0.298 (0.215)	0.502** (0.229)	0.551* (0.300)	0.159 (0.108)	0.182** (0.075)
Residence: Town	-0.052 (0.198)	0.135 (0.205)	0.109 (0.256)	0.000 (0.100)	0.049 (0.070)
Constant	-1.291** (0.584)	-0.969 (0.600)	-0.394 (0.723)	0.282 (0.293)	0.357* (0.205)
Observations	607	607	607	607	607
R-squared				0.02	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix A1.6 Poland: Evaluation Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	Closeid	Partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Evaluation Treatment	-0.147 (0.165)	0.067 (0.174)	-0.375* (0.221)	-0.098 (0.083)	0.010 (0.058)
Age	0.050** (0.025)	0.054** (0.026)	0.081** (0.032)	0.020 (0.013)	0.012 (0.009)
Age-Squared	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Higher Education	0.280 (0.257)	0.275 (0.272)	0.166 (0.340)	0.015 (0.128)	0.114 (0.090)
Secondary Education	0.194 (0.187)	0.275 (0.197)	0.509** (0.258)	0.038 (0.094)	0.138** (0.066)
Residence: City	0.302 (0.215)	0.503** (0.229)	0.568* (0.301)	0.161 (0.107)	0.183** (0.075)
Residence: Town	-0.040 (0.199)	0.127 (0.206)	0.122 (0.257)	0.008 (0.100)	0.047 (0.070)
Constant	-1.195** (0.586)	-1.043* (0.603)	-0.279 (0.728)	0.347 (0.294)	0.340* (0.206)
Observations	607	607	607	607	607
R-squared				0.02	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2.1 Russia: Information Treatment Interacted with Knowledge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Information	0.651	0.596	0.701	0.223	0.189
Treatment	(0.397)	(0.431)	(0.527)	(0.184)	(0.180)
Info Cue X Mid	-0.382	-0.562	-0.622	-0.033	-0.215
Third Know	(0.518)	(0.548)	(0.638)	(0.245)	(0.240)
Info Cue X Low	-0.317	-0.366	-0.399	-0.018	-0.177
Third Know	(0.530)	(0.552)	(0.639)	(0.249)	(0.245)
Knowledge: Mid	-0.321	-0.396	-0.533	-0.174	-0.189
Third	(0.371)	(0.386)	(0.429)	(0.180)	(0.176)
Knowledge: Low	-0.814**	-0.962**	-0.868**	-0.368**	-0.421**
Third	(0.379)	(0.388)	(0.425)	(0.181)	(0.178)
Age	0.026	0.030	0.059*	-0.008	0.016
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Age-Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	-0.304	-0.481	-0.463	-0.188	0.022
	(0.441)	(0.453)	(0.507)	(0.209)	(0.205)
Secondary	0.148	-0.034	-0.333	0.076	0.203
Education	(0.421)	(0.432)	(0.484)	(0.200)	(0.196)
Constant	-0.451	0.301	0.287	1.069***	0.780**
	(0.803)	(0.819)	(0.881)	(0.387)	(0.379)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402
R-squared				0.05	0.06

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2.2 Russia: Evaluation Treatment Interacted with Knowledge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Evaluation	-0.122	0.285	1.596***	0.058	0.131
Treatment	(0.394)	(0.428)	(0.607)	(0.183)	(0.179)
Eval Cue X Mid	0.405	0.078	-1.100	-0.124	0.156
Third Know	(0.518)	(0.550)	(0.710)	(0.246)	(0.240)
Eval Cue X Low	-0.554	-0.881	-1.970***	-0.476*	-0.431*
Third Know	(0.530)	(0.552)	(0.707)	(0.249)	(0.243)
Knowledge: Mid	-0.689*	-0.674*	-0.398	-0.129	-0.357**
Third	(0.365)	(0.377)	(0.394)	(0.172)	(0.168)
Knowledge: Low	-0.682*	-0.673*	-0.213	-0.130	-0.281
Third	(0.391)	(0.403)	(0.426)	(0.184)	(0.180)
Age	0.023	0.029	0.068*	-0.010	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Age-Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	-0.246	-0.452	-0.509	-0.139	0.024
	(0.443)	(0.456)	(0.516)	(0.210)	(0.205)
Secondary	0.128	-0.065	-0.428	0.092	0.176
Education	(0.423)	(0.435)	(0.491)	(0.201)	(0.196)
Constant	-0.050	0.433	-0.175	1.147***	0.830**
	(0.823)	(0.840)	(0.898)	(0.393)	(0.384)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402
R-squared				0.05	0.07

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2.3 Hungary: Information Treatment Interacted with Knowledge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Information Treatment	0.132 (0.340)	-0.384 (0.378)	-0.127 (0.438)	0.000 (0.173)	-0.069 (0.175)
Info Cue X Mid Third Know	0.441 (0.494)	0.881* (0.524)	1.080 (0.685)	0.371 (0.259)	0.323 (0.261)
Info Cue X Low Third Know	-0.260 (0.523)	0.289 (0.538)	-0.170 (0.588)	-0.027 (0.269)	-0.014 (0.272)
Knowledge: Mid Third	-0.744** (0.359)	-1.156*** (0.389)	-0.296 (0.457)	-0.509*** (0.189)	-0.557*** (0.191)
Knowledge: Low Third	-0.915** (0.377)	-1.343*** (0.404)	-1.044** (0.447)	-0.618*** (0.197)	-0.714*** (0.199)
Age	-0.001 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.036)	-0.077* (0.043)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.018)
Age-Squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Higher Education	0.701** (0.293)	0.459 (0.302)	0.571 (0.358)	0.293* (0.153)	0.282* (0.155)
Secondary Education	0.014 (0.272)	-0.218 (0.274)	0.003 (0.312)	-0.024 (0.144)	-0.009 (0.145)
Constant	0.152 (0.959)	1.970** (0.995)	3.210*** (1.195)	1.266** (0.500)	1.890*** (0.505)
Observations	409	409	409	409	409
R-squared				0.10	0.11

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2.4 Hungary: Evaluation Treatment Interacted with Knowledge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Evaluation	-0.540	-0.405	0.326	-0.078	-0.135
Treatment	(0.344)	(0.375)	(0.435)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Eval Cue X Mid	0.174	0.099	-1.045	-0.201	-0.034
Third Know	(0.500)	(0.524)	(0.667)	(0.260)	(0.262)
Eval Cue X Low	0.307	-0.206	-0.879	-0.052	-0.178
Third Know	(0.522)	(0.536)	(0.588)	(0.268)	(0.269)
Knowledge: Mid	-0.662*	-0.767**	0.716	-0.239	-0.385**
Third	(0.361)	(0.383)	(0.492)	(0.184)	(0.186)
Knowledge: Low	-1.218***	-1.053**	-0.625	-0.600***	-0.613***
Third	(0.396)	(0.411)	(0.441)	(0.203)	(0.205)
Age	-0.002	-0.037	-0.079*	-0.007	-0.020
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Age-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	0.720**	0.519*	0.685*	0.315**	0.307**
	(0.293)	(0.304)	(0.361)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Secondary	0.061	-0.174	0.098	0.012	0.014
Education	(0.274)	(0.277)	(0.315)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Constant	0.538	1.876*	2.890**	1.297***	1.894***
	(0.948)	(0.983)	(1.164)	(0.492)	(0.496)
Observations	409	409	409	409	409
R-squared				0.10	0.12

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2.5 Poland: Information Treatment Interacted with Knowledge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	selfid	closeid	partylike	selfstr	closestr1
Information	-0.384	-0.456	-0.160	-0.100	-0.083
Treatment	(0.329)	(0.373)	(0.565)	(0.151)	(0.105)
Info Cue X Mid	0.665	0.570	-0.043	0.145	0.089
Third Know	(0.416)	(0.463)	(0.673)	(0.195)	(0.136)
Info Cue X Low	0.483	0.386	-0.073	0.236	0.078
Third Know	(0.467)	(0.490)	(0.658)	(0.217)	(0.152)
Knowledge: Mid	-0.783**	-0.677*	-0.590	-0.348**	-0.138
Third	(0.306)	(0.346)	(0.505)	(0.140)	(0.098)
Knowledge: Low	-1.684***	-1.691***	-1.642***	-0.781***	-0.493***
Third	(0.362)	(0.384)	(0.512)	(0.165)	(0.115)
Age	0.014	0.012	0.035	0.002	-0.001
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Age-Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	-0.053	-0.074	-0.260	-0.149	0.008
	(0.273)	(0.289)	(0.360)	(0.129)	(0.090)
Secondary	-0.148	-0.088	0.086	-0.121	0.029
Education	(0.203)	(0.214)	(0.275)	(0.096)	(0.067)
Residence: City	0.159	0.368	0.412	0.097	0.136*
	(0.223)	(0.238)	(0.309)	(0.106)	(0.074)
Residence: Town	-0.206	-0.013	-0.033	-0.054	0.007
	(0.208)	(0.215)	(0.266)	(0.099)	(0.069)
Constant	0.652	1.072	1.865**	1.205***	0.944***
	(0.703)	(0.743)	(0.942)	(0.333)	(0.233)
Observations	607	607	607	607	607
R-squared				0.07	0.08

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2.6 Poland: Evaluation Treatment Interacted with Knowledge

	(1) selfid	(2) closeid	(3) partylike	(4) selfstr	(5) closestr1
Evaluation	-0.118	-0.032	-1.777**	-0.251*	-0.045
Treatment	(0.326)	(0.365)	(0.781)	(0.150)	(0.105)
Eval Cue X Mid	0.018	0.112	1.724**	0.303	0.073
Third Know	(0.411)	(0.455)	(0.860)	(0.193)	(0.135)
Eval Cue X Low	-0.357	0.010	1.324	-0.010	0.036
Third Know	(0.469)	(0.485)	(0.851)	(0.217)	(0.152)
Knowledge: Mid	-0.452	-0.424	-1.831**	-0.433***	-0.129
Third	(0.301)	(0.330)	(0.762)	(0.140)	(0.098)
Knowledge: Low	-1.287***	-1.487***	-2.715***	-0.674***	-0.472***
Third	(0.340)	(0.359)	(0.766)	(0.159)	(0.111)
Age	0.008	0.009	0.029	0.000	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Age-Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Higher Education	-0.075	-0.091	-0.261	-0.149	0.006
	(0.272)	(0.289)	(0.363)	(0.129)	(0.090)
Secondary	-0.158	-0.096	0.074	-0.119	0.028
Education	(0.203)	(0.214)	(0.277)	(0.096)	(0.067)
Residence: City	0.185	0.385	0.428	0.105	0.139*
	(0.223)	(0.238)	(0.311)	(0.105)	(0.074)
Residence: Town	-0.168	0.003	-0.025	-0.052	0.008
	(0.207)	(0.214)	(0.267)	(0.098)	(0.069)
Constant	0.623	0.903	3.156***	1.323***	0.937***
	(0.707)	(0.742)	(1.116)	(0.335)	(0.235)
Observations	607	607	607	607	607
R-squared				0.07	0.08

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A3.1 Poland: Information Treatment Interacted with Knowledge in Cities

	(1) selfid	(2) closeid	(3) selfstr	(4) closestr1
Information Treatment	-0.625 (0.634)	-0.765 (0.797)	-0.213 (0.288)	-0.028 (0.198)
Info Cue X Mid Third Know	1.072 (0.789)	1.378 (0.967)	0.145 (0.375)	0.172 (0.258)
Info Cue X Low Third Know	1.564 (0.973)	1.978* (1.098)	0.652 (0.470)	0.253 (0.324)
Knowledge: Mid Third	-1.183** (0.554)	-1.254* (0.701)	-0.339 (0.253)	-0.162 (0.174)
Knowledge: Low Third	-2.018*** (0.726)	-2.860*** (0.839)	-0.851** (0.339)	-0.551** (0.234)
Age	-0.018 (0.053)	-0.048 (0.062)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.018)
Age-Squared	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Higher Education	0.333 (0.480)	0.484 (0.560)	0.109 (0.235)	0.246 (0.162)
Secondary Education	0.163 (0.392)	0.112 (0.439)	0.126 (0.195)	0.178 (0.135)
Constant	1.438 (1.311)	2.694* (1.552)	1.458** (0.632)	1.031** (0.436)
Observations	167	167	167	167
R-squared			0.06	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%